Appearance
Mark Hofmann
The claim:
"In the early to mid-1980s, the Church paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in expensive and valuable antiquities and cash to Mark Hofmann — a con man and soon-to-be serial killer — to purchase and suppress bizarre and embarrassing documents into the Church vaults that undermined and threatened the Church's story of its origins. The documents were later proven to be forgeries."[1]
"The lack of discernment by the Brethren on such a grave threat to the Church is troubling."[1:1]
The Hofmann affair is one of the more difficult chapters in modern Latter-day Saint history. The CES Letter concentrates the difficulty into a discernment question: if prophets cannot detect a forger, what good is prophetic authority? Two of the underlying factual claims are wrong on the documentary record — the Salamander Letter was not Church-purchased, and the Church did not suppress it. A third charge (Hinckley was significantly dishonest) overstates a real but narrower institutional cost. The central question, however, is real, and it deserves a careful answer rather than a dismissal.

Two people died
The Hofmann affair is sometimes told as a story about apologetics and a forged letter. It is more accurately a story about murder. On the morning of October 15, 1985, two pipe bombs detonated in Salt Lake City. The first killed Steven F. Christensen, a 31-year-old husband, father, document collector, and serving bishop in his ward.[2] The second killed Kathy Sheets, the wife of Christensen's business partner Gary Sheets — a woman who had no role at all in any document transaction. The next day, a third bomb detonated prematurely in Mark Hofmann's car, severely injuring him and triggering the investigation that would eventually expose his decade of forgeries.[2:1] [3]
The bombings were not desperate flailing — they were calculated. Hofmann was nearing financial collapse. His debts to investors and lenders had grown beyond what even his successful forgery operation could service, and the Salamander Letter and other documents he had been promising to "find" were drawing skeptical scrutiny. Christensen was the document collector most likely to expose him; Sheets was killed to make the bombings look like they targeted Christensen's business associates rather than Hofmann's document deals.[2:2]
Steven Christensen had purchased the Salamander Letter from Hofmann in January 1984, after extensive consultation with leading document examiners and historians.[4] [2:3] He spent over a year having the letter forensically authenticated and historically researched before donating it to the Church. He was a careful, faithful, generous man whose interest in early Latter-day Saint history led him into the orbit of a man who would later kill him to silence him.[2:4] Kathy Sheets was sweeping her front porch when Hofmann's bomb killed her.[3:1]
Any account of the Hofmann affair that does not begin here misses what the affair actually was. It was not primarily about Brethren and apologetics. It was a homicide investigation that exposed a forgery operation. The forgery operation included Latter-day Saint documents because Latter-day Saint history is a lucrative collectibles market — but it also included Emily Dickinson, Mark Twain, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, John Adams, and Daniel Boone.[5] The Brethren are one part of this story. They are not its protagonists, and they are not its primary victims.
Two questions the affair actually raises
The CES Letter's framing tends to fuse two questions that the evidence answers separately:
- The forensic question. Could anyone — including the Brethren — have detected Hofmann's forgeries in 1984 or 1985 by ordinary means available to careful investigators?
- The spiritual-authority question. Should prophets in particular, given what scripture and the Latter-day Saint canon promise about prophetic gifts, have detected what others could not?
The forensic question is answered by what the FBI, the Library of Congress, leading handwriting experts, and major academic historians did and did not detect. The spiritual-authority question is answered by what the canon actually claims about prophetic discernment, what the Latter-day Saint historical pattern shows about prophet-deception, and what bounded prophetic authority in fact includes. The forensic answer does not by itself discharge the religious answer, and the religious answer does not by itself discharge the forensic answer. Both are needed.
Forensic question: the most skilled forger in American history
Hofmann produced and sold hundreds of forged documents between roughly 1980 and 1985.[6] The Latter-day Saint documents — the Anthon Transcript (1980), the Joseph Smith III Blessing (1981), the Salamander Letter (1984), the McLellin Collection (offered but never delivered), and dozens more — were a portion of his output. The non-Latter-day Saint forgeries were equally extensive. A list found under Hofmann's prison mattress in 1988 catalogued documents he had forged or planned to forge, including signatures and writings of George Washington, John Adams, John Quincy Adams, Daniel Boone, John Brown, Andrew Jackson, Mark Twain, Nathan Hale, John Hancock, Francis Scott Key, Abraham Lincoln, John Milton, Paul Revere, Myles Standish, Button Gwinnett, and "a previously unknown poem in the hand of Emily Dickinson."[7] [3:2]

The Southwestern Association of Forensic Document Examiners — the professional body whose members spent careers detecting exactly this kind of fraud — voted Hofmann "the best forger — or at least the best forger who was caught — in the past 1,200 years."[5:1]
The forensic methodology
Hofmann's craft was not a matter of clever signatures. He sourced period-appropriate paper from the blank end-leaves of nineteenth-century books bought at antiquarian sales. He manufactured his own iron-gallotannate ink using a period recipe he reconstructed from research. He developed a chemical aging protocol — sodium hydroxide treatment — that artificially induced the oxidation patterns iron-gall ink takes on over a century. He studied period handwriting with such meticulousness that handwriting experts who knew the relevant scribes' actual signatures could not distinguish his work from authentic specimens.[3:3] [8]
The forgeries were not detectable by the standard tools of 1984. They were eventually detected by novel forensic chemistry developed after the bombings forced an investigation, using methodology that did not exist before George Throckmorton and William Flynn invented it.[8:1] [9]
Everyone — including the FBI and the Library of Congress — was deceived
This is the single most important contextual fact for the forensic question, and the one the CES Letter most consistently elides. Hofmann did not deceive only Latter-day Saint authorities. He deceived essentially every relevant American forensic, archival, and scholarly authority in the relevant period:
- The Federal Bureau of Investigation. The FBI's document laboratory initially authenticated the Salamander Letter as genuine.[5:2]
- The Library of Congress. The Library's Conservation Office conducted a two-month scientific study of Hofmann's most ambitious forgery, the Oath of a Freeman, and reported nothing inconsistent with mid-seventeenth-century attribution. The Library nearly purchased the Oath for $1.5 million; the sale fell through on provenance concerns rather than any forensic detection.[10] [3:4]
- The American Antiquarian Society. Held the Oath of a Freeman for two months and reported "as far as we know, there are no anomalies."[10:1]
- Kenneth W. Rendell. One of the world's foremost handwriting experts and the man who had broken the Hitler Diaries forgery case the previous year. Rendell's report on the Salamander Letter found "no indication that the document is a forgery" based on ink, paper, and postmark analysis.[11] [12]
- Charles Hamilton. The legendary autograph dealer, often called "the nation's pre-eminent detector of forged documents." Hamilton authenticated multiple Hofmann forgeries before being exposed; he later admitted: "He fooled me — he fooled everybody."[6:1]
- Independent forensic laboratories in Dallas and Kansas City, the McCrone Research Institute, the University of California, and the U.S. Postal Service's forensic document examiners (Albert Somerford and James Dibowski authenticated the Joseph Smith III Blessing).[3:5] [2:5]
- Dean Jessee, the Church Historical Department's leading expert on early Latter-day Saint manuscripts, who authenticated the Anthon Transcript as a Joseph Smith holograph.[6:2]
- Dozens of professional historians, both Latter-day Saint and non-Latter-day Saint, including major scholars who treated the Salamander Letter as plausible historical evidence.[13]
Dallin H. Oaks summarized the scope in his 1987 Ensign accounting:
"Hofmann succeeded in deceiving many: experienced Church historians, sophisticated collectors, businessmen-investors, national experts who administered a lie detector test to Hofmann, and professional document examiners, including the expert credited with breaking the Hitler diary forgery."[12:1]
Gordon B. Hinckley said the same thing more directly: "I frankly admit that Hofmann tricked us. He also tricked experts from New York to Utah, however. We bought those documents only after the assurance that they were genuine."[14]
The Oath of a Freeman is the key non-Latter-day Saint comparison case. Hofmann produced a forged copy in 1985 and offered it to the Library of Congress for $1.5 million. The Library's Conservation Office subjected the document to extensive scientific testing over a two-month period — the kind of rigorous, well-resourced forensic examination that no Latter-day Saint authority ever applied to the Salamander Letter or any other Hofmann document. The Library's analysis identified no inconsistency with mid-seventeenth-century origin.[10:2] [3:6]
That is the answer to the forensic question. Detection in 1984–1985 required tools that did not yet exist; no relevant authority had them; the Brethren did not have them either. This is what the universal-expert-deception case discharges, and only this. It does not by itself answer the religious question — the FBI did not claim revelatory access to documents purportedly from Joseph Smith, and the Brethren did. The asymmetry is real.
Spiritual-authority question: what discernment actually claims
The CES Letter's deeper charge is that this is not just a forensic question — that the Brethren claim a kind of spiritual authority over Latter-day Saint history that should have been audible somewhere in the room when Hofmann was selling forgeries about Joseph Smith. The honest engagement requires saying what scripture actually promises and what it does not.
What the canon claims it includes
Doctrine and Covenants 46:23 identifies "the discerning of spirits" as a spiritual gift: "And to others the discerning of spirits."[15] In Latter-day Saint usage and across the broader Christian tradition, the gift addresses spiritual claims and spiritual beings — distinguishing whether a particular spirit, doctrine, or messenger is from God. Moroni 7:12–19 develops the same theme: the capacity to distinguish what is of God from what is of the devil.[16]
What the canon and the Restoration tradition affirmatively claim about prophetic authority — what is included, not just excluded — is concrete enough to test:
- Revelation about doctrine. The President of the Church can declare new doctrine "as revelation from God" (Harold B. Lee), accepted by the Council of the Twelve and sustained by the body of the Church (D&C 26:2, 28:13, 107:27).[17] [18]
- Authority to administer ordinances. Priesthood keys for baptism, confirmation, sealing, temple ordinances, and the Sacrament rest in the senior leadership and are delegated through the priesthood.
- Spiritual confirmation of truth. When the Spirit prompts, prophets and ordinary members alike can recognize when something is consistent or inconsistent with revealed truth.
- Recognition of false doctrine when the Spirit prompts. When doctrinal error is presented as binding revelation, prophets and apostles have repeatedly identified it (Pratt against Adam-God; Joseph F. Smith against Adam-God in writing in 1897; the 1916 First Presidency and Twelve in "The Father and the Son").
- Pastoral discernment in priesthood ministering. Bishops and stake presidents have promised inspiration in callings, in counseling members, in extending callings, and in priesthood blessings — within ordinary spiritual and pastoral channels.
Each of these is a real, scripture-grounded claim, with cases in the Latter-day Saint historical record where the gift operated as claimed. The most substantial recent scholarly engagement with the Hofmann affair — J. B. Haws's 2021 BYU Studies Quarterly article on Murder among the Mormons — develops a parallel framework, treating the discernment question as one of what scriptural authority claims about the prophetic gifts and what it does not.[19]
What the canon excludes
The same canon explicitly disclaims certain things. D&C 10:37 reads: "But as you cannot always judge the righteous, or as you cannot always tell the wicked from the righteous, therefore I say unto you, hold your peace."[20] This is the Lord himself, in a revelation directly to Joseph Smith, telling Joseph that prophetic capacity does not include infallibly distinguishing the wicked from the righteous in every case. The verse occurs in the context of people in Joseph's own ministry whose intentions Joseph could not fully see.
The biblical canon reinforces the same pattern. In Joshua 9, Joshua and the Israelite leaders are deceived by the Gibeonites' fake provisions and false claims to be foreign travelers; the text specifies they "asked not counsel at the mouth of the Lord" (Joshua 9:14), and Joshua's covenant with the Gibeonites stands despite being procured by deception.[21] In 1 Kings 13, the man of God who confronted Jeroboam is deceived by an old prophet who lies to him about a fresh revelation.[22] In Acts 9, the Apostles are initially suspicious of Saul of Tarsus despite his genuine conversion; recognition of his authentic discipleship requires specific revelation through Ananias.[23]
Joseph Smith and the Kinderhook Plates establish the same pattern within the Restoration tradition itself. Wilburn Fugate, Robert Wiley, and Bridge Whitton manufactured a set of brass plates with mock ancient characters and arranged for them to be "discovered" near Kinderhook, Illinois, in 1843. The plates were brought to Joseph Smith. According to William Clayton's contemporaneous journal, Joseph examined the plates and offered an initial translation — "a descendant of Ham" and so on. He did not recognize them as a hoax.[24] Modern scientific analysis confirmed in 1980 that the plates were nineteenth-century forgeries; Fugate's later confession is corroborated by the chemical analysis.[25] This is not a clean precedent that the Hofmann affair fits comfortably inside; it is another instance of the same difficulty — the same kind of physical-document fraud, the same kind of prophetic deception by it. The bounded-discernment framework absorbs both episodes; it does not make either episode disappear.
The careful maximalist position — engaged directly
There is a strawman version of the CES Letter's worry: that prophets must have FBI-level investigative discernment. Few thoughtful Saints actually hold that view, and engaging it accomplishes little. The careful version is sharper: many Saints have reasonably inferred from how prophetic authority is talked about over the pulpit that prophets have general spiritual sensitivity that helps them recognize people who present as faithful but are operating in serious spiritual deception. A Saint who concludes "a man who has just murdered two people that morning to protect a forgery he is selling to the Church about Joseph Smith should produce some spiritual signal in the room when he meets with an apostle" is not constructing a strawman — they are extrapolating from how prophetic authority is presented in ordinary Latter-day Saint discourse.[26]
The honest engagement is this. The Latter-day Saint canon does not promise that ordinary spiritual perception will always recognize people who present in deceptive ways but who do not directly present spiritual claims that violate revealed doctrine. Hofmann did not walk into Oaks's office and announce a new revelation from God; he presented as a credentialed document dealer with a prearranged appointment about acquisitions. What the canon and the historical record do support is a bounded version: prophets receive revelation about doctrine, administer ordinances, recognize spiritual error when the Spirit prompts, and exercise pastoral discernment within ordinary spiritual channels — but are not promised infallible affective recognition of every individual's hidden criminal acts. Saints who hold the broader maximalist view are giving up something real when they update it — the everyday-experiential sense that the spiritual world is unusually loud in the room when an apostle meets a murderer. That intuition has affective weight the technical category argument cannot fully discharge, and the article will not minimize it.
What "discernment" actually was, in Tanner's case
The CES Letter's specific argument that "the Tanners had better discernment than the Brethren" deserves careful unpacking. In the technical scriptural sense, "discerning of spirits" is not what Sandra Tanner exercised in March 1984 when she published "Is It Authentic?" in the Salt Lake City Messenger. She did not claim to recognize a spirit; she did not claim spiritual revelation; she did not frame her work as discernment in the gift-of-the-Spirit sense.[27] [28]
What she did was historical pattern-recognition. She had previously studied Eber Howe's 1834 Mormonism Unvailed in detail. She noticed that the Salamander Letter's content patterns — particularly the white-salamander-transforming-into-a-spirit framing — paralleled Howe's earlier published characterization of Joseph Smith's treasure-digging activities with suspicious precision. She inferred that the parallel was too close to be coincidence and said so in print. When Hofmann eventually confessed, he confirmed he had used Howe's Mormonism Unvailed as his template — exactly as Tanner had inferred.[28:1] [3:7]
Calling this "pattern recognition" rather than "discernment" is not a dodge — it is what Tanner herself called it, and it is what scripture's technical sense of the word reserves the gift of the Spirit for. But the everyday-English version of the criticism survives the technical move, and the article will not pretend otherwise. Tanner saw something Latter-day Saint historians did not see, when both had access to the same evidence, and the published, falsifiable, available-in-print objection she made deserved more institutional engagement than it got. The honest explanation is institutional cognitive bias: Latter-day Saint historians had a faith-context interest in interpretations that preserved compatibility with the canonical Joseph Smith story, a research-tradition interest in genuine document discoveries, and an instinct to discount Tanner's objections partly because the Tanners were known critics whose work was sometimes polemical. None of these is corruption. All of them, together, produced a pattern in which a published, specific, falsifiable objection from a critic was insufficiently engaged. That is a real institutional cost.
What would falsify the bounded-discernment claim
A claim is meaningful only if it is falsifiable. The bounded-discernment framework — prophets receive revelation about doctrine, administer ordinances, recognize spiritual error when the Spirit prompts, and exercise pastoral discernment within ordinary spiritual channels, but are not promised infallible recognition of every individual's hidden acts — would be untenable if the canon promised more, if the founding-prophet pattern showed detection of physical fraud, if the Brethren had claimed spiritual authentication of Hofmann's forgeries on revelatory grounds, or if Tanner's specific objections had been engaged and dismissed in bad faith. None of those conditions are met.[29] That is what makes the framework prospective rather than ad hoc — the rule the tradition has always claimed about prophetic authority, when applied to the same evidence the CES Letter cites, classifies the Hofmann affair as consistent with bounded prophetic authority rather than falsifying it.
The Salamander Letter chronology
The CES Letter's most specific factual claim is that the Church "paid hundreds of thousands of dollars . . . to purchase and suppress" the Salamander Letter and similar documents.[1:2] The chronology, on the documentary record, makes this claim factually unsupportable.

Who purchased it
"Hofmann finally sold the letter to Steven F. Christensen on January 6, 1984, for $40,000."[4:1]
Steven F. Christensen — the man Hofmann would later kill — was a private collector and bishop. He was not the Church. He purchased the Salamander Letter from Hofmann in his personal capacity, and he did so in January 1984. This is the documented record. The Church did not purchase the Salamander Letter from Hofmann.
Who received it
Christensen, in turn, donated the letter to the Church. As Oaks summarized in his 1987 Ensign accounting:
"Some months later, after Christensen completed his research and authentication, he delivered this letter to President Hinckley as a gift to the Church."[12:2]
The donation occurred in April 1985 — over a year after Christensen's purchase, after Christensen had spent that year having the letter forensically examined by leading document experts. The Church received it as a gift, not a purchase.
What the Church did with it
The Church then published the full text of the Salamander Letter in the Church News on April 28, 1985 — not a partial summary, not a redacted version, the complete document.[4:2] [30] This was over five months before the bombings, almost two years before the Throckmorton-Flynn forensic breakthrough that exposed Hofmann's chemistry, and well before any forensic authority anywhere had concluded the document was forged. The Church published the contents — the very contents the CES Letter says it was buying to "suppress" — at a moment when the Church and essentially everyone else still believed the document was genuine.
Whatever else this looks like, it does not look like suppression. An institution attempting to suppress a damaging document does not publish the complete document in its own newspaper before any external pressure has built up to expose it. The "buying to suppress" framing is incompatible with the documented chronology.
Elder Oaks's 1985 talk
The CES Letter's strongest single excerpt — and the part of the Hofmann affair that reads worst in retrospect — is from Elder Dallin H. Oaks's CES Symposium address on August 16, 1985. The talk was delivered roughly four months after the Salamander Letter was donated to the Church, and roughly two months before the bombings exposed Hofmann.
What Oaks actually said
The relevant section of the talk:
"Another source of differences in the accounts of different witnesses is the different meanings that different persons attach to words. We have a vivid illustration of this in the recent media excitement about the word salamander in a letter Martin Harris is supposed to have sent to W.W. Phelps over 150 years ago. All of the scores of media stories on that subject apparently assume that the author of that letter used the word salamander in the modern sense of a 'tailed amphibian.' One wonders why so many writers neglected to reveal to their readers that there is another meaning of salamander, which may even have been the primary meaning in this context in the 1820s . . . [a spirit able to live in fire] . . . In view of all this, and as a matter of intellectual evaluation, why all the excitement in the media, and why the apparent hand-wringing among those who profess friendship with or membership in the Church? The media should make more complete disclosures, but Latter-day Saint readers should also be more sophisticated in their evaluation of what they read."[31]
The specific argument was correct; the framing was wrong
The 1820s philological point was a real observation. In nineteenth-century occult and folk-magic discourse, a "salamander" was understood as one of the four elemental spirits — a being that could live in fire — drawing on Paracelsian elemental theory.[31:1] [12:3] Oaks's observation that Martin Harris (if he had used the word) might have meant a fire-spirit rather than a tailed amphibian was historically defensible. The philological argument was scholarship.
The broader framing of the talk was something else, and it is what the CES Letter quotes. Oaks did not just contextualize the word salamander — he built an apologetic frame around the document's authenticity, treating skepticism of the document as itself a form of unsophisticated reading. "Why all the excitement?" implies the excitement was unwarranted. "Why the apparent hand-wringing?" implies the hand-wringing was unjustified. "Latter-day Saint readers should also be more sophisticated" implies that reasonable Saints should have moved past their concerns. The 1985 audience could see that the skepticism was being driven by serious scholars (the Tanners, Wesley Walters), not just by sensationalist reporters; the talk's framing dismissed that skepticism. That posture is the substantive criticism, separate from the retrospective forgery exposure.
The document was a forgery. The "excitement" turned out to be exactly proportionate to the real situation; the "hand-wringing" turned out to be vindicated by subsequent events. Saints who took Oaks's counsel and stopped worrying about the Salamander Letter were, two months later, watching news coverage of the bombings and the eventual confirmation that the letter had never been authentic. The CES Letter's quotation of Oaks's "be more sophisticated" line is fair to its plain meaning. There is no way to make the talk read well in retrospect.
Worth Acknowledging
This is the single hardest thing in the Hofmann affair to defend. Elder Oaks delivered a talk in August 1985 telling members to be "more sophisticated" about a document that was, at that very moment, a forgery being kept in motion by a man who would commit murder two months later to protect his fraud. The talk's specific argument about 1820s usage of "salamander" was historically correct. The talk's broader framing — that media skepticism was itself an unsophisticated response — was wrong, the document's exposure as a forgery made the framing's wrongness obvious, and the apologetic posture toward an actively-contested document took weight a more humble posture would not have taken. The article will not pretend the 1985 talk reads well. It does not.
The 1987 follow-up
In October 1987, Oaks published an article in the Ensign — "Recent Events Involving Church History and Forged Documents" — that addressed the Hofmann affair publicly and at length.[12:4] In that article, Oaks acknowledged that the Brethren had been deceived along with many other authorities, named the FBI and the Hitler-diary expert specifically, described the 1985 talk's specific position on the Salamander Letter, acknowledged the October 15, 1985 meeting with Hofmann and offered no claim of spiritual discernment about that morning's events, and discussed the discernment question explicitly without retreating to a maximally narrow definition. The 1987 article is a meaningful improvement on the 1985 silence-or-defense posture. It is the kind of accounting the affair required, even as some details a fully transparent accounting would have engaged — the specific Tanner objections, the institutional dynamics that produced the 1985 talk's framing — went unaddressed.
President Hinckley
What was alleged
The CES Letter charges: "There was significant dishonesty by President Hinckley on his relationship with Hofmann, his meetings, and which documents that the Church had and didn't have."[1:3]
What actually happened
Hinckley met with Hofmann multiple times between 1980 and 1985 in his capacity as a counselor in the First Presidency overseeing the Church's archival acquisitions.[2:6] [30:1] The meetings were ordinary archival business: Hofmann was, by reputation, one of the country's most successful dealers in early Latter-day Saint documents, and the Church was an obvious purchaser for material like the Anthon Transcript and the Joseph Smith III Blessing. None of these meetings were secret. None involved suppression deals or threats. Hinckley's interactions with Hofmann were the same kind of interactions any major archive's acquisitions officer would have with a major dealer.
After the bombings, Hinckley made several public statements about his interactions with Hofmann. These statements were not always perfectly precise. Initial accounts in some interviews understated the number of meetings; subsequent research and documentation clarified that Hinckley had met with Hofmann more often than the early statements implied.[2:7] Hinckley's statements about which documents the Church possessed (especially regarding the McLellin Collection) were also sometimes imprecise.
The honest position
Hinckley was not deceptive in the strong sense the CES Letter charges. He was reactive rather than proactive in his public accountings, and his statements reflected what he remembered or had at hand at the time of speaking rather than the most complete possible account. As more facts emerged through journalism and the legal process, the public record grew more complete than his initial statements had been. This is consistent with imprecise memory in a high-profile, fast-moving situation.
The strongest critical reading — the version that does not rely on overstatement — is something like: the Church's institutional posture in handling the affair was defensive rather than transparent. A more proactive disclosure approach would have served the Church better in retrospect. Hinckley's accountings, while not deceptive, were part of that defensive posture. That is a fair criticism. It is the substantive cost the section concedes. The "significant dishonesty" framing the CES Letter uses does not survive the documentary record, but the institutional-defensiveness observation underneath the framing does.
The McLellin Collection
The claim
The CES Letter alleges: "Ultimately, the Church was forced to admit it had, in the First Presidency Vault, documents (McLellin Collection) that the Church previously denied it had."[1:4]
The actual situation
The McLellin situation is genuinely complicated, and parsing it requires distinguishing several different things:
Historical McLellin material that had passed through Church hands. William E. McLellin (1806–1883) was an early Latter-day Saint apostle, later a critic. Some of his journals, letters, and related material had been in Church possession at various times since his death. The Church's institutional record-keeping in the 1980s was less centralized than later policies require, and statements about what was held where were sometimes imprecise — partly because the Church had not yet developed the transparency culture later policies reflect, and the defensive instinct on archival material was real even where it was not deceptive in a specific case.[32]
Hofmann's "McLellin Collection" — the fictional cache. Hofmann had been telling collectors and Church leaders for years that he had located a substantial cache of McLellin documents that supposedly contained material damaging to the Latter-day Saint historical narrative. He had not. The "McLellin Collection" Hofmann was promising to "find" did not exist as he described it.[2:8] The transactions surrounding it were part of his ongoing fraud — he was using the prospect of this cache to extract advance money and to maintain credibility with creditors who were beginning to doubt him.
The actual McLellin journals located in 2009. The genuine McLellin journals were eventually located and acquired in 2009. Their content corroborated rather than undermined the Church's historical narrative.[32:1]
So when the CES Letter says the Church "was forced to admit it had . . . documents (McLellin Collection) that the Church previously denied it had," the situation is: yes, some McLellin-related material had passed through Church hands, and yes, statements about what was held where had not always been perfectly precise. The Church was not denying possession of damaging material that it was secretly holding — it was navigating a situation in which a forger was actively manufacturing a fictional cache to extract money, while genuine McLellin material existed in archives that did not always communicate cleanly with each other. That said, the McLellin episode is one data point in a broader institutional pattern of archival defensiveness that the Church has subsequently moved away from, and the apologetic case does not require minimizing that broader pattern.
Why Tanner's objection was not engaged
Sandra Tanner's March 1984 Salt Lake City Messenger article was substantive, falsifiable, and available in print in Salt Lake City.[27:1] It identified Howe's Mormonism Unvailed as the suspected source — the kind of objection a careful historian could have engaged seriously by going to Mormonism Unvailed and comparing the two texts directly. As far as the public record reflects, no Latter-day Saint historian engaged the Tanners' specific textual argument with comparable seriousness in 1984 or 1985. The Salamander Letter continued to be treated as plausibly authentic, by Latter-day Saint and non-Latter-day Saint historians alike, until the forensic breakthrough in 1986–87. The article concedes this institutional cost without trying to make it smaller than it was.
The forensic breakthrough
The Hofmann forgeries were ultimately exposed not by spiritual discernment, not by historical skepticism alone, and not by ordinary forensic methodology — but by novel chemistry developed after the bombings forced an investigation.
George Throckmorton, a Utah forensic document examiner, was appointed by the Salt Lake County Attorney's office to examine the documents in Hofmann's possession after the bombings. Working with William Flynn of the Arizona Department of Public Safety crime laboratory, Throckmorton noticed something anomalous under microscope: Hofmann's iron-gallotannate ink showed an "alligator skin" pattern of microcracking that authentic nineteenth-century iron-gallotannate documents did not display.[8:2] [3:8]
Flynn experimented with sodium hydroxide treatment of iron-gallotannate ink. Sodium hydroxide produced dramatic accelerated oxidation — years of natural aging in days — but initial recreations did not match Hofmann's exact pattern. The breakthrough came when Flynn checked a nineteenth-century ink recipe and realized Hofmann's ink contained gum arabic, a polysaccharide. When sodium hydroxide encountered the gum arabic, the polymer matrix became brittle, and rapid drying produced precisely the alligator-skin pattern Throckmorton had observed.[8:3] [9:1]
This was novel forensic chemistry. The methodology did not exist before Throckmorton and Flynn worked it out in 1986–87. Detection in 1984 or 1985 was not possible by the methods then available. That answers the forensic question — and only the forensic question.
The Oaks-Hofmann meeting on October 15, 1985
What happened
On the morning of October 15, 1985, Mark Hofmann had a prearranged meeting with Elder Dallin H. Oaks in the Church Office Building.[12:5] The bombings that killed Steven F. Christensen and Kathy Sheets had occurred earlier that same morning, but the bomber was unknown at that point. Hofmann arrived at the meeting some hours after detonating the bombs that killed two people. He behaved, by all accounts, as the businesslike document dealer the Church staff knew him as. The meeting concerned ongoing document business. Oaks did not know who had set the bombs. He did not know that the man across the desk was the killer. He proceeded with the meeting as he would have any prearranged appointment with a credentialed document dealer.[12:6] [33]
The CES Letter's framing — and the felt-experience question
The CES Letter, citing Worrall's The Poet and the Murderer, frames this scene as decisive evidence against prophetic discernment: "Elder Oaks had a serial murderer right in front of him in his office just hours after Hofmann killed two people . . . What does this say about the discernment of the Brethren when they can't discern a murderer and con man, hell-bent on destroying Mormonism, right under their noses?"[1:5]
The technical version of the criticism — that Oaks should have detected Hofmann's recent crimes — depends on a specific assumption about what scripture promises. The bounded-discernment framework above answers it: the canon does not promise that prophetic gifts include detecting hidden recent criminal acts in the absence of any external information.
But there is a sharper version of the criticism, less technical and more felt: not did Oaks detect something, but did Oaks experience anything? If a man who had murdered two people that morning produced no spiritual unease whatsoever in the presence of an apostle, what does that say about the practical texture of prophetic spiritual perception? That is a different question from "did discernment fail," and it has affective weight the technical answer does not fully discharge.
Scripture does not promise that affective experience either. The bounded framework includes pastoral discernment and spiritual confirmation of revealed truth; it does not promise that the felt experience of prophetic authority is unusually loud in every interaction with a person in serious deception, particularly when that person presents as ordinary and is not directly making spiritual claims that violate revealed doctrine. Joshua had ordinary affective responses to the Gibeonites; the man of God in 1 Kings 13 had ordinary affective responses to the deceiving prophet; the Apostles had ordinary affective responses to Saul of Tarsus — until specific revelation intervened. The intuition that the spiritual world should have been louder in the room is real, and it has affective weight; the canon's bounded promise — addressed in detail by the reliability of spiritual witnesses framework — is what scripture actually says, and the Hofmann meeting is consistent with it.
Modern teaching on prophetic fallibility
The doctrine of bounded prophetic authority is not an apologetic move invented to handle the Hofmann affair. It is canonical Latter-day Saint teaching, going back to Joseph Smith's own time:
- Joseph Smith acknowledged he had "the frailty of human nature like other men" in remarks to the Nauvoo Relief Society on August 31, 1842.[34] His best-known articulation of the bounded principle — "a prophet was a prophet only when he was acting as such" — was recorded in his journal entry of February 8, 1843, and later published in History of the Church and Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith.[35]
- Bruce R. McConkie wrote in his 1981 letter to Eugene England: "With all their inspiration and greatness, prophets are yet mortal men with imperfections common to mankind in general. They have their opinions and prejudices and are left to work out their own problems without inspiration in many instances."[36]
- Dieter F. Uchtdorf, in October 2013 General Conference: "And, to be perfectly frank, there have been times when members or leaders in the Church have simply made mistakes."[37]
This teaching is not new, not occasional, and not a recent retreat. It is consistent across the dispensations of the Restoration. The framework into which the Hofmann affair must be fit is one in which prophets can be deceived in non-spiritual matters and the canon explicitly affirms this — not one in which prophets must be infallible at detecting human deception or the doctrine collapses.
What's hard, what's not
There are real, residual difficulties from the Hofmann affair, and the article concedes them directly:
Oaks's 1985 talk reads worse in retrospect than it did at the time. The 1820s philological point about salamander was correct, but the broader "be more sophisticated about media coverage" framing was wrong, and the document's later exposure as a forgery made the framing's wrongness obvious. The 1987 Ensign follow-up addressed the affair but did not make the 1985 talk read better.
Hinckley's accountings were imprecise. His initial public statements about how often he had met with Hofmann and what documents the Church had handled were less complete than later documentation showed. The "significant dishonesty" framing is wrong on the record, but the underlying institutional-defensiveness observation is fair.
Latter-day Saint historians did not engage the Tanners' specific textual objection seriously enough. The March 1984 Salt Lake City Messenger article was substantive, falsifiable, and available. The honest answer is institutional cognitive bias, and that is a real cost.
The affair limits maximalist versions of prophetic-authority claims. Saints who have inferred from how prophetic authority is talked about that prophets have general spiritual sensitivity to serious deception in every interaction are working with a doctrine the canon does not actually promise.
Other parts of the CES Letter's case are simply incorrect:
The Salamander Letter was not Church-purchased and was not suppressed. Christensen purchased it; Christensen donated it; the Church published its full contents in the Church News before forgery exposure.[4:3] [12:7]
The Brethren were deceived by methods that no relevant authority could detect at the time. That answers the forensic question. The list of also-deceived authorities — FBI, Library of Congress, American Antiquarian Society, Rendell, Hamilton, Jessee, McCrone, U.C. labs, Postal Service forensic examiners, and the dozens of academic historians — places the Brethren in an enormous and entirely respectable comparison class on the forensic question.
No prophetic claim was overturned by any Hofmann forgery. The Salamander Letter was forged specifically to provide manufactured evidence for folk-magic origins of the Restoration. Its exposure as a forgery removed that manufactured evidence from the historical record entirely; the canonical First Vision and Moroni accounts stand exactly where the documentary evidence had always placed them. The Anthon Transcript forgery, the Joseph Smith III Blessing forgery, and other Hofmann productions, on exposure, returned the historical questions they purported to address to their pre-Hofmann state. The affair did not move any doctrinal claim of the Church.
Sister-article alignment — and where this case differs
The companion articles in this section follow related but distinct frames. Adam-God leans on the canonized-binding-doctrine tests (D&C 26:2 in 1830, 28:13 in 1830, 107:27 in 1835) — tests that were prospectively in scripture before Brigham's first Adam-God sermon, and that classified Adam-God as non-binding by rules predating the rhetoric. Blood Atonement leans on the operational-vs-rhetorical distinction — supported by Brigham's own February 1857 sermon as in-context qualifier, and by D&C 134's canonized doctrinal floor predating the rhetoric. Each rests on a tightly bounded scriptural test that produces a falsifiable verdict in real time.
The Hofmann affair is structurally different. The question is not "did this become binding doctrine" — it never did. The question is "did the Brethren detect a forger," and the bounded-discernment framework that answers it is grounded in D&C 46:23, D&C 10:37, Moroni 7:12–19, Joshua 9, 1 Kings 13, Acts 9, and the Kinderhook Plates precedent — itself the closest Restoration-era parallel to a prophet being deceived by a physical-document fraud, and a case the translator-claims discussion examines in detail. That framework is, however, less crisp than the canonized-binding-doctrine tests in the sister articles, because what discernment includes is more interpretively contested than what makes doctrine binding. The Hofmann defense is structurally less tight than the sister-article defenses, because the underlying question is interpretively softer. Naming that asymmetry makes the trio of articles more coherent rather than less.
Assessment
The Hofmann affair is a genuine difficulty for maximalist versions of Latter-day Saint prophetic-authority claims, and the article will not minimize this. The honest reading concedes that Elder Oaks's 1985 talk landed badly, that President Hinckley's accountings were imprecise, that Latter-day Saint historians should have engaged Sandra Tanner's specific textual objection more seriously than they did, and that the Brethren were among the many authorities deceived by Hofmann's forgeries. The doctrine the Church actually teaches about prophetic authority is more bounded than the maximalist version, and the affair illustrates the boundedness.
What the affair does not do is overturn the actual scriptural doctrine. Joshua was deceived by the Gibeonites. The man of God in 1 Kings 13 was deceived by an old prophet. The Apostles were initially suspicious of Saul of Tarsus despite his genuine conversion. Joseph Smith was deceived by the Kinderhook Plates. The Latter-day Saint canon, since 1831, has affirmed that prophets speak "in their weakness, after the manner of their language" (D&C 1:24) and that even in revelation directly to Joseph Smith the Lord has said "you cannot always tell the wicked from the righteous" (D&C 10:37). Prophetic authority, as the canon actually claims it, does not extend to infallibility at detecting human fraud — and the canon itself is the source of this limitation, not an apologetic retreat from it.
The CES Letter's specific factual claims about the affair are mixed. Two are wrong on the documentary record: the Salamander Letter was not Church-purchased and was not suppressed; Hinckley was imprecise rather than significantly dishonest. The third — that "the Tanners had better discernment than the Brethren" — is wrong in the technical scriptural sense the bounded-discernment framework defends, though its everyday-English version carries the institutional-cognitive-bias cost the article has conceded.
The Hofmann affair is not, in its actual historical shape, primarily a story about prophetic authority. It is a story about a career criminal who fooled essentially the entire American forensic and archival establishment in pursuit of money, who killed two innocent people to cover his fraud, and who was eventually exposed by novel chemistry developed after the murders forced an investigation. The Brethren were participants in this story in the way the FBI, the Library of Congress, and the American Antiquarian Society were participants — as institutions handling material the period's tools could not detect as fraudulent. Reading the affair as primarily about Latter-day Saint prophetic-authority claims requires foregrounding the Brethren and pushing the universal expert deception, the human cost, and the actual mechanism of detection into the background. When those elements are kept in view, the affair looks less like a referendum on prophetic authority and more like what it was: a homicide case. Steven F. Christensen, a 31-year-old bishop, was murdered by the man whose forgeries he had helped authenticate. Kathy Sheets, who had nothing to do with any of it, was killed because Hofmann needed misdirection. That is the heart of the story.
The Latter-day Saint canon teaches that prophets are real, prophetic authority is real, and prophetic fallibility in non-revelatory matters is also real. All three things are simultaneously true. The Hofmann affair is consistent with all three, and it is the kind of test the framework was designed to absorb. It is also worth remembering what no Hofmann forgery touched and what no Hofmann exposure shifted: the Book of Mormon — a 270,000-word text dictated in roughly 60 working days, with no substantive revisions, no whistleblowers, and a documentary record that the most aggressive forgery operation of the modern era could not weaken because it produced no claim against the book at all. The hardest chapters of the Restoration's institutional history are real. So is the bedrock the institutional history rests on. The Hofmann affair illustrates the limits of what the Latter-day Saint tradition actually claims about prophetic authority. The Book of Mormon, untouched by any of it, illustrates the limits of what the naturalistic counter-explanation can claim.
For sister-article treatments of related questions about prophetic authority and fallibility, see Adam-God and Blood Atonement. For the broader section, see Prophets.
Runnells, CES Letter (2017), "Prophets," pp. 66-68. The Hofmann subsection of the Prophets section. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
Richard E. Turley Jr., Victims: The LDS Church and the Mark Hofmann Case (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992). The official scholarly account, written by then-Managing Director of the Family History Department with full Church Historian's Office cooperation. Comprehensive treatment of the bombings, the forgery operation, the investigation, and the Church's involvement, including Hinckley's pattern of meetings with Hofmann and the Joseph Smith III Blessing trade with the RLDS Church. Available: https://archive.org/details/victimsldschurch0000turl ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
Linda Sillitoe and Allen Roberts, Salamander: The Story of the Mormon Forgery Murders (Salt Lake City: Signature Books, 1988; rev. 2006). The standard scholarly history of the affair, including a forensic appendix by George Throckmorton ("A Forensic Analysis of Twenty-One Hofmann Documents") documenting the chemistry that exposed Hofmann. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
"Salamander letter," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Salamander_letter. Documents Christensen's January 6, 1984 purchase from Hofmann for $40,000, the April 1985 donation to the Church, and the April 28, 1985 Church News publication of the letter's full contents. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
"Tales of Hofmann: Forgeries, Deceit Continue to Intrigue 20 Years Later," Deseret News, October 15, 2005, https://www.deseret.com/2005/10/15/19917491/tales-of-hofmann-forgeries-deceit-continue-to-intrigue-20-years-later/. Source for the Southwestern Association of Forensic Document Examiners "best forger in 1,200 years" assessment and the institutional authentication list (Library of Congress, American Antiquarian Society, FBI, University of California, McCrone Research Institute, independent labs in Dallas and Kansas City). ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
"Mark Hofmann," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Hofmann. Documents Hofmann's forgery career, the prison-cell list of forged signatures, Charles Hamilton's "He fooled me — he fooled everybody" admission, and Dean Jessee's authentication of the Anthon Transcript. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
"Mark Hofmann Timeline," Debunking-CESLetter, https://debunking-cesletter.com/prophets-1/mark-hofmann-timeline/. Documents the prison-cell list of 129 documents and signatures Hofmann had forged or planned to forge, including Washington, Adams, Lincoln, Twain, Dickinson, Boone, Hancock, Revere, Hale, Standish, Gwinnett, and others. ↩︎
"How Two Document Examiners Solved the Case of the Salamander Letter," Western Forensic Document Examiner, https://www.westernforensicdocumentexaminer.com/document-examiners-solved-salamander-letter-case/. Accessible technical explanation of George Throckmorton and William Flynn's forensic methodology — the iron-gallotannate microcracking pattern, the sodium hydroxide protocol, and the gum arabic insight that produced the alligator-skin effect. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
"Forger Caught by Rheology of Biopolymer Gum Arabic," Cambridge Polymer Group, https://www.campoly.com/blog/forger-caught-rheology-biopolymer-gum-arabic/. Peer-accessible polymer-chemistry explainer for how Hofmann's microcracking was detected. ↩︎ ↩︎
"Oath of a Freeman," Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oath_of_a_Freeman. The Library of Congress Conservation Office conducted a two-month scientific study and found nothing inconsistent with mid-seventeenth-century attribution; the American Antiquarian Society held the document for two months and reported "as far as we know, there are no anomalies." The proposed sale fell through on provenance issues, not on forensic detection. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
Kenneth W. Rendell, Forging History: The Detection of Fake Letters and Documents (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1994). Rendell — the same examiner who broke the Hitler Diaries case — authenticated the Salamander Letter; his subsequent published account documents the deception. ↩︎
Dallin H. Oaks, "Recent Events Involving Church History and Forged Documents," Ensign (October 1987), https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/ensign/1987/10/recent-events-involving-church-history-and-forged-documents. Originally delivered as a CES Symposium address August 6, 1987. Oaks's post-exposure public accounting; acknowledges the Brethren were among many deceived; addresses the Salamander Letter, the October 15, 1985 meeting, and the discernment question explicitly. ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎ ↩︎
Richard P. Howard, "Why Were Scholars Misled? What Can We Learn From This?" Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought 21, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 148–153. https://www.dialoguejournal.com/articles/why-were-scholars-misled-what-can-we-learn-from-this/. Documents the broad scholarly deception including major Latter-day Saint and non-Latter-day Saint historians. ↩︎
Sheri L. Dew, Go Forward with Faith: The Biography of Gordon B. Hinckley (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1996), p. 432. Source for Hinckley's "I frankly admit that Hofmann tricked us. He also tricked experts from New York to Utah, however." ↩︎
Doctrine and Covenants 46:23, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/46. "And to others the discerning of spirits." The canonical Latter-day Saint passage on discernment as a spiritual gift. ↩︎
Moroni 7:12-19, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/scriptures/bofm/moro/7. On discerning good from evil — the broader Latter-day Saint framing of discernment as the capacity to distinguish what is of God from what is not. ↩︎
Doctrine and Covenants 107:27. Requires unanimity in the First Presidency and Quorum of the Twelve for their decisions to carry "the same power and authority" as the full body of the Church. ↩︎
"Procedures to establish or modify Mormon doctrine," FAIR, https://www.fairlatterdaysaints.org/answers/Mormonism_and_doctrine/Establishing_new_doctrine/Procedures. Reproduces Harold B. Lee's articulation of the binding-doctrine procedure: "The only one authorized to bring forth any new doctrine is the President of the Church, who, when he does, will declare it as revelation from God, and it will be so accepted by the Council of the Twelve and sustained by the body of the Church." Includes the broader synthesis of Latter-day Saint teaching on prophetic fallibility, citing Joseph Smith, Brigham Young, McConkie, and modern apostolic statements. ↩︎
J. B. Haws, "Murder among the Mormons: Reflections on the Docuseries — and on Its Historical and Theological Implications," BYU Studies Quarterly 60, no. 2 (2021), https://byustudies.byu.edu/article/murder-among-the-mormons-reflections-on-the-docuseries-and-on-its-historical-and-theological-implications/. Haws (associate professor of Church history, BYU) provides the most substantial recent scholarly engagement with the Hofmann affair, addressing chronology corrections to the docuseries, the discernment question theologically, and Throckmorton's role (including the "one hundred ten hours examining the Salamander Letter" datum). ↩︎
Doctrine and Covenants 10:37, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/scriptures/dc-testament/dc/10. "But as you cannot always judge the righteous, or as you cannot always tell the wicked from the righteous, therefore I say unto you, hold your peace." Direct scriptural statement that even prophets cannot always tell the wicked from the righteous, given in revelation directly to Joseph Smith. ↩︎
Joshua 9, the deception of Joshua and the Israelites by the Gibeonites. Verse 14 specifies the Israelite leaders "asked not counsel at the mouth of the Lord" — a biblical pattern of prophet-deception by physical fraud (faked provisions, false claims about geography). ↩︎
1 Kings 13:11–18, the man of God deceived by an old prophet who lied to him about a fresh revelation. Biblical precedent for prophet-deception by another prophet's false claim. ↩︎
Acts 9:10–17, the Apostles' initial suspicion of Saul of Tarsus despite his genuine conversion; recognition required specific revelation through Ananias. ↩︎
William Clayton's journal, May 1, 1843, recording Joseph Smith's initial examination and partial translation of the Kinderhook Plates. Documented in the Joseph Smith Papers Project, https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/journal-december-1842-june-1844-book-2-10-march-1843-14-july-1843/68. Formally published in The Joseph Smith Papers, Journals, Volume 2: December 1841–April 1843, ed. Andrew H. Hedges, Alex D. Smith, and Richard Lloyd Anderson (Salt Lake City: Church Historian's Press, 2011). ↩︎
Stanley B. Kimball, "Kinderhook Plates Brought to Joseph Smith Appear to Be a Nineteenth-Century Hoax," Ensign (August 1981), https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/ensign/1981/08/kinderhook-plates-brought-to-joseph-smith-appear-to-be-a-nineteenth-century-hoax. Documents the 1980 chemical analysis (D. Lynn Johnson, Northwestern University) confirming the Kinderhook Plates were nineteenth-century forgeries, corroborating Wilburn Fugate's confession. ↩︎
The careful maximalist worry is not that prophets must be FBI investigators but that ordinary Latter-day Saint discourse — "watchmen on the tower," the Lord will not let his prophet lead the Church astray, priesthood blessings producing real spiritual perception, the temple as a place where spiritual realities are unusually present — teaches Saints to expect that prophets have general spiritual sensitivity helpful in recognizing serious deception. Saints extrapolate from those teachings to scenes like the Oaks-Hofmann meeting. The extrapolation is not unreasonable, even where (as the body argues) the canon itself does not promise what the extrapolation assumes. The documents Hofmann had been selling made historical claims that in 1985 did not appear obviously incompatible with revealed doctrine — many faithful historians read the Salamander Letter as compatible with a folk-magic context for early Restoration figures without finding it doctrinally impossible. The kind of "general spiritual sensitivity" the maximalist worry imagines does not, by the canon's own description, override ordinary affective experience in interactions where people present as ordinary. ↩︎
Sandra Tanner, "Is It Authentic?" Salt Lake City Messenger 53 (March 1984). Sandra Tanner's first published textual objection to the Salamander Letter, based on parallels to Eber Howe's 1834 Mormonism Unvailed. Available via Utah Lighthouse Ministry, https://archive.utlm.org/onlinebooks/trackingappendixbthruf.htm. Issue number per H. Michael Marquardt's A Tanner Bibliography 1959-2022. ↩︎ ↩︎
Jerald Tanner and Sandra Tanner, Tracking the White Salamander (Salt Lake City: Utah Lighthouse Ministry, 1986), https://archive.utlm.org/onlinebooks/trackingch1.htm. The Tanners' detailed account of their textual analysis of the Salamander Letter and its parallels to Howe's Mormonism Unvailed, including documentation that Hofmann subsequently confirmed using Mormonism Unvailed as his template. ↩︎ ↩︎
The five conditions that would have falsified the bounded-discernment claim: (1) A canonized scriptural passage explicitly promising detection of human fraud as a constitutive prophetic gift — none exists; every scriptural passage on prophetic discernment ties the gift to spirits, doctrine, or revelation. (2) A founding-prophet pattern of detecting frauds with the specific scriptural authority Hofmann's forgeries purported to derive from — the relevant test case is Joseph Smith and the Kinderhook Plates, where Joseph was deceived by a similar physical-document fraud. (3) A pattern of the Brethren claiming spiritual authentication of Hofmann's specific forgeries on revelatory grounds — they did not; they relied on outside experts (Rendell, Hamilton, Jessee, the FBI document lab), not on prophetic authority. (4) Brethren as the only institution deceived in a way connected to spiritual authority claims — the Brethren did not claim spiritual authority over the documents; they treated them as historical artifacts requiring historical and forensic authentication, which is what every institution in the relevant comparison class also did. (5) Specific Tanner objections engaged substantively and dismissed on bad-faith grounds — the failure was institutional inattention, not active rejection of valid evidence. ↩︎
Sarah Allen, "CES Letter Rebuttal — Part 34: Mark Hofmann," FAIR, December 15, 2021, https://www.fairlatterdaysaints.org/blog/2021/12/15/29961. Detailed point-by-point rebuttal of the CES Letter Hofmann section, including the chronology of the Salamander Letter's purchase, donation, and Church News publication, and the documentation of Hinckley's pattern of meetings with Hofmann. ↩︎ ↩︎
Dallin H. Oaks, "Reading Church History," address at the Church Educational System Doctrine and Covenants Symposium, Brigham Young University, August 16, 1985. Full text available at https://archive.org/details/reading_church_history_1985_oaks. Includes the 1820s philological point about salamander, the "be more sophisticated" line, and the broader apologetic framing. ↩︎ ↩︎
"McLellin journal finally is located," Deseret News, January 22, 2009, https://www.deseret.com/2009/1/22/20297848/mclellin-journal-finally-is-located/. Documents the eventual recovery of the genuine McLellin journals and their contents, distinguishing them from Hofmann's fictional "McLellin Collection." ↩︎ ↩︎
Simon Worrall, The Poet and the Murderer: A True Story of Literary Crime and the Art of Forgery (New York: Dutton, 2002), p. 232. The CES Letter cites this book for the narrative of Hofmann's October 15, 1985 meeting with Oaks; Worrall's book focuses primarily on Hofmann's Emily Dickinson forgery and his broader career. ↩︎
Joseph Smith, address to the Nauvoo Relief Society, August 31, 1842. Recorded in the Nauvoo Relief Society Minute Book; reproduced in Jill Mulvay Derr et al., eds., The First Fifty Years of Relief Society: Key Documents in Latter-day Saint Women's History (Salt Lake City: Church Historian's Press, 2016), and in Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, comp. Joseph Fielding Smith (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book, 1938), p. 278. Source for "the wrong that I do is thro' the frailty of human nature like other men." ↩︎
Joseph Smith, journal entry of February 8, 1843, in History 1838–1856, vol. D-1, p. 1483; reproduced in History of the Church 5:265 and Teachings of the Prophet Joseph Smith, p. 278. Source for "a prophet was a prophet only when he was acting as such." Joseph Smith Papers: https://www.josephsmithpapers.org/paper-summary/history-1838-1856-volume-d-1-1-august-1842-1-july-1843/187. ↩︎
Bruce R. McConkie, letter to Eugene England, February 19, 1981. https://www.eugeneengland.org/a-professor-and-apostle-correspond-eugene-england-and-bruce-r-mcconkie-on-the-nature-of-god. McConkie's articulation of prophetic fallibility: "With all their inspiration and greatness, prophets are yet mortal men with imperfections common to mankind in general. They have their opinions and prejudices and are left to work out their own problems without inspiration in many instances." ↩︎
Dieter F. Uchtdorf, "Come, Join with Us," October 2013 General Conference, https://www.churchofjesuschrist.org/study/general-conference/2013/10/come-join-with-us. "And, to be perfectly frank, there have been times when members or leaders in the Church have simply made mistakes." Modern apostolic affirmation of prophetic fallibility from the pulpit of General Conference. ↩︎